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Using aggregate data on employment and hours of work from three Canadian provinces 
at two levels of the retail trade industry, I estimate a simple dynamic labour demand 
model in order to examine retail firm responses to Sunday shopping deregulation. The 
estimates suggest that deregulation resulted in long run increases in both the employment 
level and the average weekly hours of hourly paid retail workers. Comparison of the 
results between the two data sets suggests that the employment gains were larger among 
general merchandise stores than among more specialized retail establishments. In 
addition, despite evidence of an immediate shortfall in the employment level below the 
long run optimal level, the results from both data sets suggest that firms were unable to 
compensate by temporarily increasing the hours of their existing employees.       
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1. Introduction 
  Over the past forty years a number of countries in the Western world have 
witnessed the dismantling of legislation that has historically, in some cases for hundreds 
of years, restricted business activity on the Christian day of Sabbath. The international 
trend toward Sunday shopping deregulation has been most extensive in North America 
but is more recently showing signs of gaining momentum in Western Europe. In the 
United States a steady decline in the number of states that impose a general ban on all 
Sunday business and labour activity began in the early 1960’s so that by 1985 only 22 
states still had general bans compared to 35 in 1961.
1 A similar decline began in Canada 
in the early 1980’s and continued until 1998, when Newfoundland was the last province 
in the country to pass some form of deregulating legislation. In contrast, in Europe only 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden and Spain had taken any formal steps to deregulate 
Sunday retail activity prior to the 1990’s.
2 However, over the past decade England and 
Wales, the Netherlands and then Finland opted to relax their restrictions on Sunday 
shopping.
3 Furthermore, there is indication that France and Italy are similarly moving in 
the direction of deregulation.
4 
  Reference to the popular press of these countries reveals that legislative changes 
have taken place amid contentious political and public debates about the costs and 
benefits of Sunday shopping. In fact, in some political jurisdictions opposition to Sunday 
                                                 
1 The research by Laband and Heinbuch (1987) on Sunday shopping restrictions, or “blue-laws” as they are 
known in the U.S., is the most recent complete collection of state legislation throughout the U.S..              
2 Kajalo (1997) has done extensive research to collect information on the legality of Sunday retail business 
across Europe. This information is available from his website: www.hkkk.fi/talsos/internat.htm. 
3 England and Wales deregulated all Sunday shopping in 1994, while the Netherlands in 1996 and Finland 
in 1997 opted to permit Sunday shopping for part of the year (Kajalo 1997). 
4 For the French case see “Government grasps Sunday law nettle” International Management, October 
1991, pp.20-1 and for Italy see “Open up!” The Economist, March 14, 1998, p.59.   3   
shopping following a deregulating initiative has actually been strong enough to reinstate 
restrictions.
5 A common concern in all these debates is the expected labour demand 
impact of Sunday shopping. In particular, will retail firms satisfy their need for Sunday 
employment by increasing the weekly hours of existing employees or by hiring new 
workers? Or is it possible that deregulation has neither an hours nor an employment 
impact as labour demand is reduced during the rest of the week? Opponents and 
proponents of deregulation have often based their arguments on their expectations of 
these labour demand effects.
6  
  Despite the widespread debate in the popular press there is a dearth of empirical 
research examining the labour demand effects of deregulation. In an early attempt to 
evaluate the economic impact of Sunday shopping, Kay, Morris, Jaffer and Meadowcroft 
(1985) use consumer surveys to predict what impact deregulation will have on retail sales 
in England. This estimate is then combined with an assumed labour demand elasticity 
estimate with respect to sales to predict a short run increase in overall retail employment 
of 5 percent.
7 More recently, Gradus (1996) estimates a model of retail behaviour for the 
                                                 
5 In 1994 Spain moved from complete deregulation to only eight Sundays per year of unrestricted Sunday 
shopping (Kajalo 1997). Nova Scotia, Canada opted to entirely repeal their legislation following a three 
month experiment which proved unpopular with retailers (see “Sunday store openings not worth it: 
retailers” Halifax Chronicle Herald, November 26, 1993, p.B6). More recently, Norway has repealed the 
exemption of large supermarkets from its strict Sunday shopping legislation (see “Norway’s Sunday best” 
The Economist, August 1, 1998, p.43) and Kajalo (1997) reports that in Finland there is evidence of 
growing support among citizens for renewed regulation.  
6 Opponents of deregulation, of which Christian churches and trade unions are typically the most vocal, 
argue that deregulation will force some existing employees to work on Sundays against their will. They 
also emphasize possible undesirable effects on religious and family oriented activities. In response, 
proponents point to the presence of workers with low preferences for Sunday leisure, such as students, who 
will gain employment opportunities as a result of Sunday shopping. Further, they argue that legislators can 
easily provide retail employees with the legal right to refuse Sunday work. Opponents criticize that these 
protections are weak as they are unable to protect new hires from discrimination.   
7 In the long run, Kay et al. (1984) actually predict a slight decline of around 1 percent in full-time 
equivalent retail jobs. Their argument is that extended opening hours increases the sales capacity of the 
retail sector without actually increasing sales. The resulting overcapacity of the industry implies that 
smaller, less efficient stores will be unable to compete with larger, retailing firms that may operate multiple 
stores. In the long run this restructuring of the industry will result in overall job losses.   4   
Netherlands and simulates the employment impact of deregulating store opening hours 
using evidence from the Swedish experience with deregulation. His estimates suggest that 
increasing opening hours by 10 will lead to a 1.6 percent increase in Dutch retail jobs.
8 
The obvious problem with these estimates is that both are simulations based on data from 
countries that have yet to experience deregulation. In contrast, Laband and Heinbuch 
(1987) examine the deregulation impact by comparing states with general bans on all 
Sunday commercial activity to states with no restrictions. The weakness of their research 
is that they simply compare raw averages between regulated and unregulated states.
9 
Clearly, there may be many other differences between the two sets of states that can 
explain the observed variations in employment and hours of work.  
  The Canadian experience offers an ideal setting to examine the consequences of 
Sunday shopping as the legislation is provincial and was introduced at different times. As 
a result, a “natural experiment” exists in which common movements in the retail industry 
data between provinces can be controlled for so as to isolate the deregulation effect. This 
paper exploits this setting and estimates a simple dynamic labour demand model that 
allows employment and hours to be imperfect substitutes in production. The resulting 
estimates provide some evidence on how retail firms adjust employment levels and hours 
of work in response to an exogenous increase in permitted business hours. They indicate 
that deregulation led to a long run increase in both the employment level and average 
weekly hours of work. Yet, despite short run rigidities in the employment level there is 
                                                 
8 Note that the Gradus (1996) estimate is of full-time equivalent jobs whereas Kay et al. (1984) distinguish 
between full-time and part-time workers. Using the existing full-time/part-time mix in English retailing, 
Kay et al. predict a 3.3 percent increase in full-time equivalent jobs.   
9 For example, they suggest that deregulation reduces hours of work by comparing average weekly hours in 
blue law and non-blue law states. Even more troublesome is that their data is average weekly hours of  
production workers in the manufacturing industry.   5   
no evidence that firms compensated by temporarily increasing the weekly hours of either 
new or existing employees.  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
Canadian legal experience with Sunday shopping deregulation and discusses why data 
from only three provinces is used. The theoretical model, empirical specification and data 
used to examine the employment and hours of work response of retail firms are presented 
in Section 3. In Section 4 the results are examined. In conclusion, some implications of 
the empirical results are considered.    
 
2. The Canadian Experience 
The Canadian process of deregulation began in 1985 when the Supreme Court of 
Canada found the federal Lord’s Day Act, which had designated Sunday as a weekly day 
of rest since its adoption in 1907, to be unconstitutional.
10 The immediate implication of 
this ruling was that the ten individual provinces were now responsible for determining the 
legality of Sunday shopping. At that time Newfoundland already had legislation in place 
restricting retail business on Sundays. British Columbia and Ontario had also opted out of 
federal control before 1985, but had passed legislation providing municipalities with 
exclusive autonomy to regulate retail business hours.
11 By 1993 all provinces had passed 
legislation either restricting Sunday shopping (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), providing municipal autonomy (Saskatchewan, 
                                                 
10 This ruling was based on the logic that the Act violated the guarantee of religious freedom enshrined in 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982. 
11 Ontario passed legislation in 1975 and British Columbia in 1980. In Ontario by 1985, 13 of 45 cities 
adopted early closing by-laws. Ferris (1991) exploits this variation to examine the determinants of the 
legislation itself. For example, he finds that higher female labour force participation rates reduce the 
probability that a community will restrict Sunday shopping presumably because such communities value 
extended shopping hours relatively more.   6   
Alberta and British Columbia) or permitting wide-open Sunday shopping (Manitoba, 
Quebec and Ontario).
12 Of the provinces that originally regulated business hours all have 
now either experimented with Sunday shopping (Nova Scotia), permitted it during part of 
the year (Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick) or entirely deregulated 
(Newfoundland). The result is a patchwork of legislation that is not only complicated by 
municipal jurisdiction in some provinces, but also by season and type of retail 
establishment.     
  An attempt to empirically evaluate the labour demand consequences of Sunday 
shopping deregulation using provincial aggregate data requires the use of a time-series 
indicator variable for each province that captures the dates of legal change. Table 1 
contains the most complete information available at this date on the legality of Sunday 
shopping across Canada. It is presented here to emphasize the difficulty of creating 
simple time-series dummy variables for each province indicating the legality of Sunday 
shopping. For provinces with province-wide legislation the task is somewhat manageable. 
For example, the Quebec series is simply 0 prior to January 1993 and 1 thereafter. 
However, for the western provinces where municipalities have determined the legality of 
Sunday shopping there is no single date of deregulation. Ideally, a researcher could 
collect information from City Clerks’ offices across these provinces and use the resulting 
legislative data, along with the proportion of total provincial retail sales made in each 
municipality, to construct a continuous variable between 0 and 1 indexing the legality of 
Sunday shopping. An attempt was made to collect legal information from cities across 
British Columbia. The information obtained reveals that the transition from the Lord’s 
                                                 
12 Beginning in December 1992, Manitoba conducted a 10 month province-wide experiment with Sunday 
shopping. This experiment was followed by legislation providing exclusive municipal autonomy. 
Winnipeg, the largest city in the province, has chosen not to introduce restrictions.      7   
Day Act to deregulation has been a piecemeal process and in the case of some cities 
changes in the legality of Sunday shopping are somewhat ambiguous.
13 As a result, the 
task of constructing an accurate indicator variable for provinces like British Columbia is 
complicated and at times requires judgement.    
  A second problem exists if the legislative dummy variables are being used to 
study the behaviour of retail establishments that chose to respond to deregulation by 
opening on Sundays, rather than the impact of the legislation itself. The reason is that the 
legislative changes do not necessarily correspond to actual changes in the business hours 
of retail firms. First, many types of establishments, such as variety stores and retailers in 
the tourism industry, were never constrained by the Lord’s Day Act. Second, some 
retailers, such as those in small, rural and religious communities may choose to remain 
closed on Sundays despite legislative deregulation. For these types of retailers the 
provincial legislative changes, even if they are province-wide, will result in neither 
employment nor hours adjustments. To the extent that these establishments are prevalent, 
any structural changes at the legislative dates are unlikely to show up in the provincial 
aggregate data. The point to be made is that the legislative dates in Table 1 are only 
empirically useful in so far as they correspond to significant increases in the amount of 
Sunday retail openings occurring in a province.  
    Given these measurement problems, it is important to first determine whether the 
legal changes in any of the provinces actually correspond to significant increases in 
Sunday retail activity. This is done by testing for structural changes at the legislative 
dates in the trading-day regression given by: 
                                                 
13 Richmond, Victoria, Vancouver and Coquitlam deregulated Sunday retail hours in 1981, Maple Ridge in 
1985 and Chilliwack in 1990. Interestingly, Langley and Abbotsford have no restrictions on Sunday 
shopping despite the absence of a by-law formally deregulating it.   8   
it t i t i t it it t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i i it
T T r Y u SAT FRI
THU WED TUE MON SUN Q
ε γ γ γ γ γ β β
β β β β β α
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + + =
2
5 4 3 2 1 7 6
5 4 3 2 1    (1) 
where  it Q  is real, per capita retail sales,  it u  is the unemployment rate,  it Y  is real, per 
capita labour income,  t r  is the national consumer loan rate,  t T  is a simple linear trend and 
t SUN  to  t SAT  are variables that take on values of 4 or 5 depending on the number of 
instances of that particular day in month t. In order to sharpen the results, two sources of 
retail sales data that are disaggregated by type of establishment were used. The first are 
total department store sales (TDS), which are compiled from monthly surveys of all 
department stores in Canada.
14 The second are department store type merchandise sales 
(DSTM), which are based on a much broader group of retail establishments than are the 
TDS data.
15 All the series are seasonally adjusted and run from January 1981 to 
September 1999.
16  
  Since the sales data are seasonally adjusted, there is a problem in interpreting the 
parameter of interest,  i 1 β . The reason is that the adjustments purge the data of the effect 
of some months having more days than others. As a result, the effect of adding an 
additional Sunday to a month must be to reduce the incidence of some other day in that 
month. The problem is determining which day is lost. The solution is to weight the 
estimates of  ji β , 7 , . . . , 1 = j , by the vector  SUN SUN c c c 4 5 − =  where  kSUN c  is a 7-
element vector containing the means of  t SUN  to  t SAT  in months with k  Sundays. The  
                                                 
14 The TDS data are published monthly in Department store sales and stocks, Statistics Canada, Catalogue 
no. 63-002.  
15 The DSTM data are published monthly in Retail Trade, Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 63-005. They 
are calculated as total retail sales minus food sales, all sales related to motor and recreational vehicles and 
establishments selling alcoholic beverages.   
16 The seasonal adjustment to the sales data is simply to regress sales on a set of month dummy variables 
separately for each province. These adjustments are made to overcome biases resulting from correlation 
between the month and the days of the week variables.   9   
effect of adding an additional Sunday is then given by  i c β ′  which has a variance of 
c Var c i ) (β ′ . If the variables  t SUN  to  t SAT  are also interacted with the legal dummy 
variables for each province in (1), another vector  i δ  is obtained. The estimate 
) ( i i c δ β + ′ then gives the effect of adding an additional Sunday after Sunday shopping 
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provides a test of whether the before and after point estimates are statistically different. 
Since c depends on whether there are 30 or 31 days in a month, there are two separate 
cases to consider.  
  The results from the trading-day regression analysis are presented in Tables 2 and 
3.
17 With the exception of Nova Scotia, all the point estimates suggest that Sunday sales 
increased following deregulation. However, the difference between these before and after 
point estimates is only statistically significant for Ontario and Alberta when the TDS data 
are examined, and for New Brunswick and Manitoba when the DSTM data are used. 
These results are, for the most part, consistent with the evidence collected from 
newspapers.
18  
                                                 
17 PEI is excluded because there is not enough variation in its legal dummy variables to identify all the 
interaction terms. Newfoundland, on the other hand, has had enough experience with deregulation to 
identify all the interaction terms but not enough to obtain meaningful estimates. British Columbia is 
excluded because there is no provincial legal change in the period 1981 to 1998. 
18 In Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba the legal changes were province-wide (for the Ontario case see 
“Shopping on Sunday wide open” Globe and Mail, July 4, 1990, pA6; for New Brunswick see “N.B. 
retailers fight back with Sunday shopping” Marketing, November 19, 1991, p1; for the Manitoba case see 
“Sunday shopping opens up” Winnipeg Free Press, November 20, 1992, pA1). In Alberta, there was a 
concerted decision by retailers in the two major cities, Calgary and Edmonton, to open stores in November 
1984 (see “Floodgates open on Sunday shopping” Calgary Herald, October 26, 1984, pA1 and “Sunday 
shopping blooms for now in Alberta” Toronto Star, November 25, 1984, pA19). The weak results for 
Saskatchewan were expected since provincial deregulation has been a piecemeal process with Regina 
deregulating in June, 1989 and Saskatoon in October, 1991 (this information was obtained through personal  10   
Since retail firms are expected to respond quite differently to deregulation if it 
only seasonal, the decision was made to restrict the labour demand analysis to those 
provinces that show both a significant increase in Sunday activity in Table 2 or 3 and 
experienced year-round deregulation. Hence, the analysis below uses only data from 
Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta.   
 
3. Model 
A. Theoretical Model 
  In order to get some idea of the kinds of firm responses to deregulation we might 
reasonably expect, a simple theoretical model that includes both employment and hours 
as imperfect substitutes in production is examined. Consider a cost-minimizing 
optimization problem in which homogenous retail firms within a province face the cost 
function: 
  N q N h w CL + =              ( 3 )  
where  L C  are total weekly labour costs, N is total employment by each firm, his 
average weekly hours of those employed, w is the average wage within each firm which 
is assumed to be independent of average weekly hours and q are quasi-fixed costs such 
as hiring, training and benefit costs. Real retail sales per representative firm are given by: 
                                                                                                                                                 
communication with Randy Markewich, City Clerk with the City of Regina, and Crystal Lowe, Records 
Administrator in the City Clerk’s Office of Saskatoon). The Nova Scotia results were also expected as there 
is strong evidence that the province’s Sunday shopping experiments were unpopular among consumers and 
retailers (see “Government retreats on Sunday shopping” Halifax Chronicle Herald, January 29, 1991, p1, 
“Sunday store openings not worth it – retailers” Halifax Chronicle Herald, November 26, 1993, pB6 and 
“Sunday shopping shot down” Halifax Chronicle Herald, April 14, 1994, pA3). The weak results for 
Quebec are however surprising. Following province-wide deregulation in January 1993, the Quebec 
Alliance for Sunday Shopping, a lobby group made up of retailers across the province, attributed large 
gains in provincial retail sales to Sunday shopping deregulation (see “The average shopper in Quebec can 
rejoice in the latest retail statistics” Montreal Gazette, March 25, 1993, pC1).    11   
  ) , , , ( MONTH Y r u H Q =         ( 4 )  
where uis the provincial unemployment rate, r is the national consumer loan rate, Y is 
real provincial labour income and MONTH is a vector of monthly dummy variables. 
  The model assumes that Q is exogenous to the optimization problem of the 
individual firm. This seems a particularly appropriate assumption for the retail industry 
where sales are by and large not a function of the labour employed to operate stores. 
Nonetheless, the total labour input employed,L, is constrained by the requirement that: 
   ) (Q G L ≥           ( 5 )  
where 0 > ′ G  and  0 > ′′ G . If the production function for units of total labour input is 
given by: 
 ) , ( N h F L =           ( 6 )  
where 0 , > N h F F  and  0 , < NN hh F F , a retail firm’s optimization problem can be 
expressed as: 
 ) ( ) , ( min
, Q G N h F to subject CL N h ≥ .       ( 7 )  
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In order to derive closed-form solutions for N  and h, it is convenient to assume the 
following functional forms for F and G : 
  s h N s h N h F ≥ < < − =
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γ A Q Q G         ( 1 1 )   12   
where sis the time it takes each worker to “set-up” for work and  A is a threshold level 
of labour demand which is needed to oversee an open store regardless of the level of 
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assuming that  ε α > − ) 1 ( . This solution has the attractive result that only the 
employment level is a function of retail sales so that optimal average weekly hours will 
be relatively constant over the long run as the data suggest they are.
19 
  Having derived a simple theoretical model of the retail firm, it is now possible to 
consider what impact Sunday shopping deregulation is expected to have on employment 
and working time in the retail industry. In his examination of the economic impact of 
extending shop opening hours, Gradus (1996) distinguishes between three possible 
effects on employment. First, to the extent that extended hours actually leads to an 
increase in Q there will be an increase in the long run employment level working 
through the production function or in the above model through 
γ Q  in equation (13). The 
size of this sales effect will depend not only on how much Sunday shopping increases 
total retail activity, but also on the output elasticity of the labour input, γ , and the 
marginal product of employment parameter, α . However, over all reasonable values of 
γ and α  the sales effect will be weak if deregulation has a small impact on Q.  
                                                 
19 This is a consequence of the production function for the total labour input. Indeed, any function of the 
form L = g(h) N
1-α  where g′  > 0 and g′′  < 0 will produce this result. Clearly, there exists a wide range of 
production functions that are multiplicatively separable in h and N, including the Cobb-Douglas form. 
Moreover, this particular form follows directly from the fact that the total labour input, L, is the product of 
the number of workers employed and the average weekly hours of these workers.    13   
  Second, even if deregulation has absolutely no impact on Q, either because 
Sunday sales are nil or there is a one-for-one tradeoff between Sunday and Monday-
Saturday sales, increased opening hours implies a necessary increase in labour demand as 
there are more hours in which a store needs to be supervised. Thus, deregulation should 
lead to an unambiguous increase in A. Since Aenters (13), but not (12), this threshold 
effect will also serve to increase the total labour input entirely through the hiring of new 
workers, as opposed to increasing the hours of existing workers. 
  Finally, Gradus follows Thurik (1984) and argues that extending opening hours 
could have a labour productivity effect by flattening sales peaks during the day and 
thereby reducing the labour intensity at these times. This “smoothing” effect of Sunday 
shopping can be formally modeled by altering the basic model above so that there is a 
separate labour input constraint, as given by (5), for each day of the week. The minimum 
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after deregulation, where iindexes the days of the week and both  B Q  and  A Q  are vectors 
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where the first term is the threshold effect and the difference between the second and 
third term captures the sales and productivity effects. If  i B i A Q Q =  for  7 , . . . , 2 = i  the 
total effect is simply the sum of the threshold effect,  1 A , and the sales effect, 
γ
1 A Q . In this 
case the productivity effect is nil because there is no “smoothing” of sales over the days 
of the week. However, to the extent that there is a redistribution of sales over the days of 
the week there will be a productivity effect that will serve to reduce the positive sales 
effect. In fact, even if ∑∑ > i B i A Q Q , with enough “smoothing” of sales and 
convexity in the labour input constraint, it is entirely possible that ∑∑ <
γ γ
i B i A Q Q so 
the productivity effect actually dominates the sales effect.  
  Therefore, when all three effects are taken together the theoretical model is unable 
to predict whether deregulation will increase or decrease the employment level in the 
long run. The only unambiguous prediction of the model is that average weekly hours 
will be unaffected by deregulation for a wide class of production functions. The 
possibility that Sunday shopping actually reduces the employment level is undoubtedly 
contrary to popular wisdom. However, to the extent that the productivity effect dominates 
the threshold and sales effects, it is a theoretical possibility. This implies that a properly 
specified empirical model should allow for this possibility by separately identifying all 
three potential effects of deregulation.  
 
B. Empirical Specification 
The theoretical model suggests that deregulation will impact the optimal demand 
for workers, but not average weekly hours. Moreover, optimal employment can be  15   
affected by deregulation in three possible ways. This suggests that an appropriate linear 
specification in the logarithms of all the continuous variables is given by: 
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where t indexes the month, ithe province,  t T  is a linear time trend and  it d  is the 
deregulation indicator variable. Although the theory predicts that  0 1 = γ , the parameter 
is included to provide a test of this theoretical result.  
  With reference to equation (17), it is possible to decompose the long run change 
in the employment level following deregulation into the threshold, sales and productivity 
effects. If the long run predicted employment level prior to deregulation is given by: 
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and after deregulation by: 
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the employment impact of deregulation is simply the difference 
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if  it w  and  t T  are held constant. The first term in (21) is the threshold effect, the second 
term is the sales effect and the productivity effect is captured by the third term.
20 For the 
estimates to be consistent with the theory we need  0 , 0 , 0 3 2 1 < > > β β β  and 
                                                 
20 Notice that this is essentially the Oaxaca decomposition, due to Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), 
common to the discrimination literature where the gender wage gap is decomposed into a part due to 
differences in human capital acquisition between men and women and a part is due to unequal returns to 
that human capital.   16   
0 3 2 > + β β . 
  The size of the sales effect will in part be determined by  2 β , which captures how 
exogenous shocks to  it Q  translate into adjustments in the employment level. However, it 
also depends on the difference  iB iA Q Q − (  ). Thus, to estimate the sales effect it is 
necessary to also obtain an estimate of the deregulation impact on  it Q . This is done by 
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Although the theoretical model assumes  it Q  is exogenous to the labour demand decision 
of the firm, this assumption was tested using an omitted variable version of the Hausman 
test. When the TDS data are used the test strongly rejects the exogeneity of  it Q  in 
equation (17). The decision was therefore made to treat  it Q  as an endogenous variable in 
the empirical model and to use (22) as its reduced form equation.
21 
  In order to distinguish long run from short run firm responses to exogenous 
shocks it is necessary to add a dynamic element to this empirical model. Following Hart 
and Sharot (1978), the approach taken here is to assume partial adjustment of workers 
and instantaneous adjustment of hours. The rationale is that there are quasi-fixed costs of 
adjusting the employment level, whereas temporary hours adjustments are relatively 
costless. The partial adjustment process is given by: 
  1
* ) 1 ( − − + = t it it N N N λ λ         ( 2 3 )  
                                                 
21 The Hausman test statistic is F(2,587) = 11.81 when the TDS data are used and F(2,786) = 2.21 with the 
DSTM data. It turns out that the general results are quite robust between specifications, although the point 
estimate of α 1 seems quite sensitive to the exogeneity assumption. This is true whether the TDS or DSTM 
data are used.          17   
where λ  provides a measure of the degree of rigidity in the employment level. Since it is 
now possible that  ,
*
it it N N ≠  the firm may substitute towards  t h  in the short run. 
Therefore, optimal short run, average weekly hours is expected to be increasing in 
) (
*
it it N N −  which can be expressed as: 
 0 , ) (
* * > − + = π π γ it it it it N N h h        ( 2 4 )  
where π  measures to what extent hours are increased in the short run to accommodate 
shortfalls in the employment level. 
  A complication with estimating equations (17) and (18) is that the retail wage is 
likely to be endogenous. To identify exogenous retail wage fluctuations, monthly 
provincial data on minimum wages and the average manufacturing wage are used as 
instruments in a reduced form equation for  i w . When this is done and the dynamic 
structure in (23) and (24) is applied to equations (17) and (18) to allow for temporary 
hours adjustments, the complete empirical model is given by the following equations: 
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and equation (22).  The presence of the endogenous variable  it N  in (26) does not present 
any problems due to the exclusion restrictions on  it Q  and  ) ( it it d Q ⋅ .   18   
  The estimation procedure involves estimating the parameters in (22), (25) and 
(26) using data from the three provinces that experienced significant changes in Sunday 
retail activity following deregulation. In order to obtain a single set of parameter 
estimates and to identify exogenous fluctuations in  it Q ,  it N  and  it w , the 12 equation 
system is estimated by 3SLS with cross-equation restrictions on all the parameters. This 
estimator also allows us to gain efficiency from contemporaneous correlations as the 
estimated error-covariance matrix captures all the variances and covariances of the errors 
in (22), (25) and (26). Thus, as in a fixed effects model, common unexplained movements 
in the sales, employment and hours data within and between cross-sections are accounted 
for. 
   
C. Data 
  The labour demand model is estimated separately using the total department store 
(TDS) and department store type merchandise (DSTM) sales data. Corresponding data by 
industrial classification on employment, average weekly hours and wages of hourly paid 
workers were constructed from data published by Statistics Canada in Employment, 
Earnings and Hours.
22 Unfortunately, these payroll data are not matched perfectly by 
industrial classification to either the TDS or DSTM sales data. The payroll data 
corresponding to the TDS sales data include department stores as well as smaller, general 
merchandise stores (SIC 6412 and 6413). The payroll data corresponding to the DSTM 
sales data exclude drug stores (SIC 641), which are in the DSTM sales data, and include a 
miscellaneous classification (SIC 659), which are not in the DSTM sales data. Monthly, 
                                                 
22 The payroll data published in Employment, Earnings and Hours, Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 72-002 
are compiled from monthly surveys of employers in each province at detailed industrial levels.   19   
provincial aggregate data on the remainder of the variables in the empirical model were 
collected which produced two complete seasonally unadjusted, time-series data sets 
covering three from January 1983 to September 1999. Summary statistics on all the 
remaining variables are provided in the Appendix. Ideally, data from the late 1970’s 
should have been included in these series, but the payroll data from Statistics Canada 
only begin in 1983. This is a problem given that Alberta experienced deregulation in 
November 1984.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
  The results from estimating equations (22), (25) and (26) with the TDS and 
DSTM data are presented in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. The sales, threshold, 
productivity and hours effects estimates are shown in Table 6 with their 95 percent 
confidence intervals. The results from both data sources suggest that quite significant 
gains in retail sales were made following deregulation. The TDS data suggest a 9.0 
percent increase in retail sales, whereas the more aggregate data suggest a 7.8 percent 
gain. Given that store hours probably increased by about 8 percent for the typical 
establishment, these estimates are high, but not implausible.
23 The difference between the 
results obtained from the two data sources may reflect that general merchandise stores 
benefited relatively more from deregulation as expected.
24 When these estimates of  1 α  
                                                 
23 Typical retail hours in Canada are 10AM to 9PM from Monday to Friday, 10AM to 6PM on Saturday 
and 12PM to 5PM on Sunday. In this case, Sunday openings will increase total retail hours by about 8 
percent. The relatively large estimated gains in retail sales may reflect pent-up recreational or tourist 
demands for Sunday shopping or simply a shift in sales away from establishments that are not included in 
the sales data. The latter consideration is particularly important in the TDS data.      
24 In Canada, there is strong evidence that political pressure for deregulation was largely driven by 
coalitions of the major department stores presumably because they expected to gain the most from 
deregulation (see “Quebec retailers join to promote Sunday shopping” Marketing October 5, 1992, p3,  20   
are combined with the labour intensity estimates, 2 β , the results suggest a modest sales 
effect on employment of about 2 to 3 percent.
25    
  In contrast, the threshold effect estimates of 48.9 percent from the TDS data and 
18.2 percent from the DSTM data exceed any reasonable explanation.
26 Similarly, the 
productivity effect estimates, given by  3 β , exceed expectation. From equation (21), the 
magnitude of the productivity effect depends on at what value of  iA Q  it is evaluated. 
However, it is not obvious what the appropriate value should be. The approach taken here 
is to calculate for each province the annual average level of log retail sales in the twelve-
month period in which deregulation occurs in the sixth month. The average of these 
values over the provinces is 11.703 in the TDS data and 6.313 in the DSTM data, which 
imply productivity effects of 38.0 percent and 13.0 percent respectively. Although we 
have no strong predictions regarding the magnitude of the productivity effect, intuition 
suggests that the amount of “smoothing” needed to reduce the long run employment level 
by one-third could not have resulted from the addition of a single day of shopping. The 
problem is that both the threshold and productivity effects are estimated imprecisely since 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Sunday closings will hurt us: Club Price” Montreal Gazette, December 17, 1991, pB1,  “Bay boycott 
urged” Briarpatch 18(4):5 and “Prairie city sees itself battling Bay St. in Sunday shopping war” Toronto 
Star, October 26, 1988, pA18).     
25 In fact, the sales effect is greater in the DSTM data. The reason is that the estimate of the labour intensity 
parameter, β 2 , is larger in the DSTM data. At least part of this difference probably reflects the superior 
sales capacity of the larger, general merchandise stores relative to the smaller, specialized merchandise 
stores included in the DSTM data.  
26Intuition suggests that the increase in the level of threshold labour, A in (13), should be equivalent to the  
increase in store hours. Thus, the threshold effect point estimates imply that the threshold labour elasticity 
of employment exceeds 3 and 5 respectively. Is this theoretically plausible? From (13) this elasticity 
reduces to: 
 






ε   . 
A necessary condition for this elasticity to exceed 5 is α  > 0.8 and by a considerable margin unless Q
γ  / A  
is close to 0. Since a solution to (7) requires that (1 - α ) > ε   the threshold effect point estimates imply 
strong decreasing returns to scale in the production of the labour input as given by (10) which is clearly a 
difficult result to explain.     21   
quite plausible values of both effects fall within 95 percent confidence intervals. In 
addition, plausible estimates are obtained when the estimates of the two effects are 
combined. The TDS and DSTM data then imply a 10.9 and 5.2 percent increase in the 
long run employment level respectively. 
  It appears that the empirical model is unable to separately identify both the 
threshold and productivity effect. The reason is simply that the threshold effect is 
calculated at  0 = it Q , but there are no data points close to 0. As a result of the linearity 
imposed on the data, any reduction in labour intensity following deregulation, reflected in 
a negative estimate of  3 β , necessarily implies a corresponding increase in the threshold  
effect. Because there are no observations when  it Q  is close to 0, the threshold effect is 
entirely determined by this change in the slope of the fitted regression line via this 
tradeoff. The point is that both estimates are identified by a single source of information, 
the change in labour intensity following deregulation. It is therefore no surprise that when 
this information is limited to identifying a single parameter, by combining the two 
effects, the estimation implies an entirely plausible employment effect of deregulation. 
When all three employment effects are combined the TDS data imply a permanent 12.7 
percent increase, whereas the DSTM data imply an 8.5 percent gain.  
  In contradiction of the theoretical prediction of constant 
*
it h , the estimate of  1 γ , 
from both data sources, implies a permanent 3 percent increase in average weekly hours. 
How can these results be explained?  A serious oversimplification of the theoretical 
model is that it assumes retail firms can adjust N and hin any possible way to produce 
the required L. However, in reality individual establishments must produce work 
schedules that divide total hours of work in a way that is acceptable to all new and  22   
existing employees. The resulting coordination problems, which will be particularly 
important with heterogeneity in workers’ tastes, may make setting a unique level of L 
without some adjustment to h impossible. The evidence here suggests that obtaining the 
desired L following deregulation involved having either some existing employees work 
Sunday shifts in addition to their regular shifts or having some new employees work 
more than the pre-deregulation level of average weekly hours.
27 
The partial adjustment parameter,λ , estimates reveal some stickiness in the retail 
industry employment level. At first glance this rigidity of employment appears 
considerable, particularly with the DSTM data, but it should be emphasized that it is 
estimated using monthly data so  it N  will be more than half-way to reaching 
*
it N , two to 
three months following a shock. The point here is that the low estimate of λ  leads to 
some short run dynamics. However, this in turn produces no short run fluctuations in 
average weekly hours due to the insignificant estimates of  4 γ  from both data sets. Thus, 
in the short run the total labour input employed,L, falls below its optimal long run level. 
Given that there were significant increases in Sunday opening hours, as the trading-day 
regression analysis suggests, how did general merchandise stores overcome this 
temporary shortfall in the labour input? The lack of substitutability between workers and 
hours probably reflects the difficulty of adjusting workers’ weekly hours of work. This 
rigidity is likely to be particularly important when retail firms are asking their existing 
workers, who in some jurisdictions have the legal right to refuse Sunday work, to 
                                                 
27 In either case, these results are in contrast to that of Upton (1986) who collected information from five 
large British retail firms that operated stores in Scotland, where there has never been formal regulation of 
Sunday shopping, to find out how their needs for Sunday employment were satisfied. He found that among 
these firms much of the labour was provided by “Sunday-only” part-timers who the firms claimed they had 
little difficulty in recruiting. Clearly, to the extent that this strategy is dominant in the industry, average 
weekly hours should fall, not rise, following deregulation.   23   
temporarily work Sunday shifts until new workers can be hired. A possible firm response 
is for store owners or managers to work Sunday shifts themselves until new employees 
with low preferences for Sunday leisure are recruited. Since the hours of store owners 
and managers do not appear in the data there is no evidence of a short run tradeoff 
between workers and hours.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Using aggregate data on employment and hours of work at two levels of the retail 
trade industry classification, a simple dynamic labour demand model was estimated to 
examine retail firm responses to an exogenous increase in permitted opening hours. The 
results suggest that Sunday shopping deregulation led to long run increases in both the 
employment level of retail workers paid by the hour and in their combined average 
weekly hours of work. There is evidence that the employment gains were driven by an 
increase in the level of threshold labour that dominated an offsetting gain in labour 
productivity. In addition, the results suggest that the employment gains were larger 
among general merchandise stores than among more specialized retail establishments. 
There is also evidence that retail firms were unable to temporarily raise the 
weekly hours of their existing employees to overcome the significant rigidities in the 
employment level. However, both data sources suggest that there was an instantaneous 
and permanent 3 percent increase in average weekly hours. Although these results imply 
that existing employees satisfied at least some of the need for Sunday labour immediately 
following deregulation, they do not provide any direct evidence on whether new or 
existing employees satisfied this need in the long run. Indeed, the results from both data  24   
sources are consistent with either new or existing employees working all the Sunday 
shifts in the long run. More precise evidence will require establishment level data with 
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Table 1 
Regulation of retail business hours in Canada 
Province  Legal change date and general rule  Legislation 
Newfoundland  Jan.1998: amendment to the Shops Closing 
Act passed to permit wide-open Sunday 
shopping throughout the province. 




Nov.1992: legislation passed to permit 
business establishments to open on Sundays 
from the last Sunday in November to the 
Sunday preceding Christmas.  
Day of Rest Act (1985) 
Retail Businesses 
Holidays Act (1992) 
Nova Scotia  Mar.1990 - Jan.1991: temporary experiment 
which allowed stores less than 40,000 sq. feet 
to open on Sundays. 
Oct.1993 - Dec.1993: temporary experiment 
with deregulation by legislative amendment. 
Retail Business 
Uniform Closing Act 
(1985) 
An Act to Amend 





Nov.1991 - Dec.1991: temporary amendment 
to permit shopping in most retail 
establishments. 
September - December of every year 
beginning in 1992: amendment to Days of 
Rest Act which allows Sunday shopping from 
first Sunday following Labour Day to the 
Sunday immediately preceding Christmas. 
August - January of every year beginning in 
1996: amendment to Days of Rest Act which 
allows Sunday shopping from first Sunday in 
August to the second Sunday after Christmas.  
Days of Rest Act 
(1985) 
Quebec  Jan.1993: wide-open Sunday shopping 




business hours (1990) 
Act to amend this law 
(1992) 
Ontario  Jul.1990 - Mar.1991: in Jun.1990 the Retail 
Business Holidays Act found to be 
unconstitutional by Ontario Supreme Court 
and in Mar.1991 the Ontario Court of Appeal 
reversed this decision. Result was 9 months of 
wide-open Sunday shopping. 
Dec.1991: legislation amended to permit 
Sunday shopping in the month of December. 
Jun.1992 - present: Bill introduced to permit 
wide-open Sunday shopping which came into 
force on June 3, 1992. 
Retail Business 
Holidays Act (1990) 
Retail Establishments 
Statute Law 
Amendment Act (1991) 
Act to Amend the 
Retail Business 
Holidays Act in 
respect of Sunday 
Shopping (1992)  26   
Manitoba  Dec.1992 - Sept.1993: two separate 
amendments to Retail Business Holiday 
Closing Act which led to 10 month 
experiment with wide-open Sunday shopping. 
Oct.1993: municipal autonomy.  
Retail Business 
Holiday Closing Act 
(1987) 
Bill 4, Retail 
Businesses Sunday 
Shopping (1992) 
Bill 23, An Amendment 
to Retail Businesses 
Sunday Shopping 
(1993) 
Saskatchewan  Spring 1988: Province passed legislation 
providing municipal autonomy. 
Urban Municipality 
Amendment Act (1988)  
Alberta  Nov.1983: Alberta Court of Appeal struck 
down Lord’s Day Act in Nov. 1983, but wide-
spread Sunday shopping began in major cities 
in Nov. 1984. In 1985, legislation passed 
officially providing municipal autonomy. 
Municipal 
Government 
Amendment Act (1985) 
British 
Columbia 
1980: legislation passed providing municipal 
autonomy.  
Holiday Shopping 
Regulation Act (1980) 
SOURCES: Human Resources Development Canada website at: http://labour-
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Table 2 
Trading-day Regression – TDS data 
                      30 Days        31 Days       
  Before After  Wald Before After  Wald 





































































Trading-day Regression – DSTM data 
    30 Days                           31 Days    
  Before After  Wald Before After  Wald 



































































  28   
Table 4 
Labour Demand Model - TDS data  
                    Qit                        Nit                        hit   
dit (α 1)  0.090 
(11.47) 
dit (β 1)  0.489 
(2.81) 
dit (γ 1)  0.032 
(4.73) 
uit (α 2)  -0.001 
(-0.59) 
Qit (β 2)  0.200 
(2.66) 
wit (γ 2)  -0.129 
(-2.37) 
Yit (α 3)  1.511 
(33.91) 
Qit⋅ dit (β 3)  -0.033 
(-2.24) 
Tt (γ 3)  -0.002 
(7.82) 
rit (α 4)  0.007 
(3.14) 
wit (β 4)  0.077 
(0.29) 
Tt
2 (γ 4)  0.1E-04 
(7.61) 
Tt (α 5)  -0.009 
(-35.05) 
Tt (β 5)  -0.4E-03 
(-0.23) 
Nit-Ni,t-1 (γ 5)  -0.001 
(0.07) 
Tt
2 (α 6)  0.3E-04 
(21.55) 
Tt
2 (β 6)  -0.1E-04 
(-1.48) 
  
   Ni,t-1 (λ )  0.202 
(12.87) 
  
NOTE: Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses. All estimates are the derived long-run 





Labour Demand Model - DSTM data  
                    Qit                        Nit                        hit   
dit (α 1)  0.078 
(13.18) 
dit (β 1)  0.182 
(2.79) 
dit (γ 1)  0.025 
(5.29) 
uit (α 2)  -0.012 
(-8.76) 
Qit (β 2)  0.424 
(8.67) 
wit (γ 2)  -0.604 
(-19.09) 
Yit (α 3)  1.095 
(30.38) 
Qit⋅ dit (β 3)  -0.021 
(-2.05) 
Tt (γ 3)  -0.003 
(-14.09) 
rit (α 4)  0.003 
(1.56) 
wit (β 4)  -0.073 
(-0.53) 
Tt
2 (γ 4)  0.1E-04 
(11.11) 
Tt (α 5)  -0.002 
(-13.14) 
Tt (β 5)  0.9E-03 
(1.29) 
Nit-Ni,t-1 (γ 5)  0.036 
(1.58) 
Tt
2 (α 6)  0.3E-05 
(3.14) 
Tt
2 (β 6)  -0.7E-05 
(-2.32) 
  
   Ni,t-1 (λ )  0.271 
(11.26) 
  
NOTE: Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses. All estimates are the derived long-run 
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Table 6 
Labour Demand Model – Combined employment and hours effects 
       TDS        DSTM   







0.004 to 0.031 
0.148 to 0.831 




0.024 to 0.042 
0.054 to 0.309 
-0.254 to –0.005 
Total employment effect  0.127  0.067 to 0.187  0.085  0.051 to 0.119  
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Appendix 
Variable descriptions and first and second moments. 
Symbol Description  Ontario  Manitoba  Alberta 
TDS  Data       




























       
DSTM  Data       
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rt  National consumer loan rate (Bank 



























NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. All real variables are constructed using 
the provincial consumer price index (1992=100).    
 
 
 